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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JIM CRITTENDEN, 
Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
vs. 
ALPINE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Defendant-
Appellee. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE SCHOOL ADMINISTRATION'S PRETERMINATION PROCEDURES 
LACKED DUE PROCESS PROTECTION. 
As appellee correctly points out in its brief, due process requires that a public employee be 
given "an opportunity to present his side of the story." Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill. 470 
U.S. 532, 546 (1985). Contrary to appellee's assertion, the undisputed facts are inconclusive as to 
whether district administrators gave Mr. Crittenden an opportunity to present his side of the story. 
In the alleged pretermination hearing, Mr. Crittenden was only allowed to confirm or deny the 
allegations against him not to offer any explanation. The undisputed facts are conclusive that Mr. 
Crittenden met with an assistant superintendent, but are inconclusive as to what happened at the 
meeting. Thus, it is a question of fact whether Mr. Crittenden was given due process as required in 
Loudermill. 
uase JNO. y/uuyi-L,/\ 
Oral Argument 
Priority 15 
The appellees' brief contemplates that not only was Mr. Crittenden given one pretermination 
hearing, but three. In an attempt to prove that the district administration provided Mr. Crittenden with 
an opportunity to be heard, the appellees quote a statement by Mr. Crittenden. This statement was 
not issued to the district and could not have been part of Mr. Crittenden's due process right to present 
his side of the story. In a further attempt to show that the administration did not deny Mr. Critten-
den's right to due process, the appellee states "latter that day, plaintiff . . . had a second meeting." 
(Brief of Appellee at 10). This meeting was not a pretermination hearing, but rather as the District 
Court found, was the termination of Mr. Crittenden, as he was given a letter notifying him of his 
termination. (Ruling at 9). It is a question of fact whether Mr. Crittenden's right to due process was 
violated by the district, and therefore the District Court erred in granting summary judgment. 
H. MR. CRITTENDEN HAS A VESTED RIGHT TO EARLY RETIREMENT. 
The appellee maintains that Mr. Crittenden does not have a vested right to early retirement 
because he "made no contributions to the plan." (Brief of Appellee at 24). In support of this position, 
the appellee cites Ellis v. Utah State Retirement Bd.. 757 P.2d 882, 886 (Utah App. 1988), affd, 783 
P.2d 540 (Utah 1989). The court in HUs states: 
an employee who receives a mere gratuitous allowance awarded for appreciation of 
past services has no vested rights in the allowance and it is terminable at will. On 
the other hand, when a retired employee had made the requisite contributions and had 
satisfied all the conditions precedent to his benefits, then the employee had a "vested 
right" in his retirement benefits. 
The districts early retirement plan is not "a mere gratuitous allowance," but rather Mr. Crittenden 
made a contribution to the plan with over 30 years of service to the appellee. 
Furthermore, the district argues in its brief that Mr. Crittenden has failed to identify language 
in the policy "that permits early retirement to one whose continued employment has already been 
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rejected for misconduct." (Brief of Appellee at 25). However, while in some cases "specified 
misconduct by an employee may result in forfeiture of pension or retirement benefits," where "a 
contractual retirement provision state[s] that an employee discharged for 'dishonesty [is] not entitled 
to receive any payment from the fund," 13 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts (Second) 531 § 6, no such 
contractual provision exists in the school district policy. In the even of any ambiguity of interpretation 
of the contract, the language of the pension contracct should be liberally construed in favor of the 
pensioner. Driggs v. Utah State Teachers Retirement Board. 142 P.2d 657 (Utah 1943). 
HI. THE MARCH 1 DEADLINE IS NOT A CONDITION PRECEDENT AND IT 
IS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS TO INTERPRET IT AS SUCH. 
The District Court improperly gave a narrow construction of the pension policy in favor of 
the school district. "Pension statutes are liberally construed in favor of the pensioner." Johnson v. 
Utah State Retirement Bd.. 770 P.2d 93, 96 (Utah 1988). According to the district, latitude should 
be given to a school district's interpretation of its own policy, but not when the interpretation is 
arbitrary and capricious. (Brief of Appellee at 25). The district is interpreting the March 1 deadline 
as a condition precedent to receiving the disputed benefits. However, such an interpretation is 
unreasonable and arbitrary and capricious. The only reasonable interpretation is that the March 1 is 
for determining whether the benefits will start the year of application or the next. Applications made 
after March 1 should be considered timely for receiving benefits the following year. In other words, 
it is a matter of administrative convenience, not a condition precedent. Otherwise, the benefits would 
arbitrarily be available only to those who apply during two months out of the year. Certainly the 
district would not deny early retirement benefits to an administrator who fell ill and decided to retire 
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on March 2 merely because she missed the deadline. A proper construction of the policy would allow 
Mr. Crittenden to apply for benefits when he learned of his plight. 
IV. MR. CRITTENDEN WAS NOT TERMINATED AT TIME OF APPLICATION. 
The district also states that Mr. Crittenden was denied his early retirement benefits, because 
at the time he applied for retirement Mr. Crittenden was "terminated" and "no longer work[ed] for 
the school district." (Brief of Appellee at 16 and 21). Mr. Crittenden was in fact suspended and not 
terminated when he applied for the benefits. The school district's policy states that notification of 
termination "shall be given in writing at least fifteen days prior to the proposed date of termination." 
(District policy no. 4759.4.1 (1986)). If Mr. Crittenden was terminated or considered terminated, 
then his right to due process was violated. 
V. THE DISTRICT WAIVED THE DEFENSE OF UNTBMELINESS. 
Finally, it cannot be emphasized enough that, as argued earlier, the district waived the 
timeliness defense by failing to raise it in its motion for summary judgment or answers to 
interrogatories. The district, in its brief, correctly restates the interrogatories at issue, one of which 
asked the district to "[s]et forth all facts upon which defendant relies to substantiate [its denial of early 
retirement benefits to Mr. Crittenden]." (Brief of Appellee at 15). The district then argues that the 
interrogatory did not ask specifically about timeliness and so it did not put the district on a duty to 
speak on the issue. (Brief of Appellee at 16). On the contrary, the interrogatory asked the district 
to set forth all facts on which it relied in denying the early retirement benefits. Timeliness of the 
application is a fact that falls into that category. The argument now presented by the district is 
disingeuous. 
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CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the District Court must be reversed, if not in whole, then in part. 
DATED this of September, 1997. 
DON R. PETERSEN, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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